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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REFORM FOR
MOMS
Karen Syma Czapanskiy*
Imagine this scenario. It is 1990. Relatively few resi-
dents of the United States were born between 1970 and 1985,
so relatively few people have entered the job market recently,
and the trend is likely to continue.' Many new jobs will need
to be filled in the coming years. Most of those jobs are likely
to be in service industries, where pay rates are often lower
than in manufacturing. Employers look around and ask, who
will they find to employ? What they see is mothers:2 one of
the few groups of people with relatively low labor force par-
ticipation is young women with young children. To get these
women to enter the labor force in large numbers, employers
realize that they have to make it possible for mothers to sat-
isfy their responsibilities at home at the same time that they
are satisfying their responsibilities at work. Mothers will
need convenient and affordable child care and transportation.
They will need flexibility, including paid leave when they are
sick or when they need to miss work to attend to a child's ill-
ness or emergency. They will need a decent rate of pay so
that they can pay for child care and still make money. They
will need access to health care for themselves and their chil-
dren. Employers busy themselves improving their employ-
ment practices, including better pay, more flexible schedules,
subsidized health insurance, extending benefits to part-time
workers, and providing paid sick and annual leave. Millions
of women decide that they and their families will be better off
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; J.D. George-
town University Law Center; B.A. University of California at Berkeley.
1. See WILLIAM JOHNSTON & ARNOLD PACKER, HUDSON INST.,
WORKFORCE 2000: WORK AND WORKERS FOR THE 21ST CENTuRY 75-85 (1987).
2. See id. at 85-89; Douglas J. Besharov, The Past and Future of Welfare
Reform, PUB. INT. 4, 10 (Winter 2003) (employers "ran out" of married mothers
to hire and began hiring single mothers in the 1990s).
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if they enter the labor force or increase their participation,
and employers breathe a sigh of relief.3
The scenario is, obviously, a fantasy except for one point:
millions of young women with young children have in fact en-
tered the paid labor force since 1990.4 Employers have not,
however, paid the price for their expanded workforce. In-
stead, the principal incentives have come from changes in fed-
eral public benefit and tax expenditure policies. Some of the
incentives have been in the form of "pulls," such as increases
in the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the refundable
child tax credit.5 Others have been in the form of "pushes,"
such as the work participation requirements and sanction
policies of welfare reform and similar changes in other public
benefit programs.' None of these changes has solved the
basic problem, however, which is that employment practices
remain heavily incompatible with parental responsibilities.
Employers have had to make few of the necessary changes to
accommodate workers who are parents.' When federal public
benefit and tax expenditure policies helped to expand the
work force and increase family dependency on earnings, the
pressure was taken off of employers. The failure of employers
to change their practices remains an issue, however, because
mothers and fathers lose their jobs when they try to meet
family responsibilities while working for pay. One conse-
quence is that, when they do lose their jobs, most states deny
them the partial wage replacement benefit called
unemployment insurance (UI).
The question I am asking in this essay is this: If eligibil-
ity for unemployment benefits were expanded to make bene-
fits more available to parents leaving the work force or reduc-
ing their labor force engagement because of parental
responsibilities, who should pay for the increased costs?
3. VICKY LOVELL & GI-TAIK OH, INST. FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH,
WOMEN'S JOB LOSS AND MATERIAL HARDSHIP 10-11 (Oct. 2003) (discussing a
similar utopian vision), available at http://www.iwpr.org/Publications/pdf.htm.
4. See AMARA BACHU & MARTIN O'CONNEL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE 2000 (2001), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/fertilty.html.
5. See infra notes 27-57 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted: The Fu-
ture of Work/Family Initiatives in a 'Me, Inc." World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
345 (2003) (employment shifting to a "me, inc." approach in which accommoda-
tions for caregiving are not provided).
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Feminists have argued, with the concurrence of others on
the left, that UI eligibility should be expanded to take into ac-
count the family responsibilities borne by many women in the
labor force.8 They have made a fully persuasive case for the
proposition that the families of women who meet their re-
sponsibilities concurrently at home and at work should not be
the ones who suffer the entire financial loss when a mother's
labor force participation is interrupted or reduced because of
her family responsibilities.9 By advocating for using UI as the
means to cover-or at least share the costs of-labor force
participation interruptions and reductions experienced by
parents, feminists and allies are, inferentially, advocating
that employers are the proper group to pay the increased cost
of UI. But the explicit case needs to be made for considering
recent changes in federal public benefits and tax expenditure
policies as part of the rationale for putting the costs of en-
hanced UI eligibility on employers.
My argument is that the recent changes in federal public
benefits and tax expenditure policies have, in effect, insulated
employers from doing what would have happened in my fan-
tasy scenario. The increased costs that employers should be
paying to lure young women with young children into the
paid labor force and to keep them there is instead being paid
by the families and by federal and state taxpayers. Employ-
ers have not had to increase pay or benefits or modify em-
ployment practices to reduce work-family conflicts.' ° As a re-
sult, parents with caretaking responsibilities lose their jobs or
are forced into the part-time job market. Given the benefits
8. See, e.g., Deborah Maranville, Changing Economy, Changing Lives: Un-
employment Insurance and the Contingent Workforce, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
291, 323 (1995) [hereinafter Maranville, Changing Econom]; Deborah Maran-
ville, Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case Study on Unemployment
Compensation Benefits and the Male Norm, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1081, 1092 (1992)
[hereinafter Maranville, Feminist Practice]; see also JOAN WILLIAMS,
UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO Do
ABOUT IT 111-12 (2000); ANNISAH UM'RANI & VICKY LOVELL, INST. FOR
WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND WELFARE
REFORM: FAIR ACCESS TO ECONOMIC SUPPORTS FOR LOW-INCOME WORKING
WOMEN 1 (2000).
9. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 8; ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF
MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE
LEAST VALUED (2001); Martha Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: In-
dependence, Autonomy, and Self Sufriciency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 13, 16 (2000).
10. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 8.
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enjoyed by employers in getting young mothers into the work-
force without paying the full cost, employers should not be
able to avoid the relatively low cost of increasing unemploy-
ment insurance coverage for these workers.
The public benefit programs at issue are Temporary As-
sistance to Needy Familiies (TANF), Food Stamps, State
Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), child care subsi-
dies, and public housing. The principal tax expenditure pol-
icy is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)." All of these
programs have a work requirement applicable to some or all
participants, or they provide subsidies to people with earn-
ings. All of the programs are targeted at low-income parents.
All of them can have an impact on increasing the labor pool
and on enhancing the value of the wage that the worker re-
ceives. All of them demand worker discipline because losing a
job means losing eligibility for vital aid as well as earnings.
As the result of the combined effect of programs such as
these, employers have a larger pool of workers from whom to
choose and employers can resist pressure to increase wages
and benefits. Employees, on the other hand, have more in-
centive to remain employed and to make few demands on
their employers because the costs of leaving work are greater
than continuing in an unfavorable employment situation.
Unemployment insurance is paid for by taxes on employ-
ers.12 Expanding UI eligibility to respond to employment is-
sues related to work/family conflicts, therefore, would result
in higher costs to employers. In the current system, almost
all of the costs of work/family conflict are placed elsewhere.
Families pay when a caregiver loses employment and no tem-
porary wage or income replacement is available, whether
through unemployment insurance or welfare. Taxpayers
generally pay to the extent that unemployed caregivers qual-
ify for partial income replacement in the form of public bene-
fits such as welfare, food stamps, or housing assistance. Em-
11. The refundable child tax credit, modified in the first tax reduction bill of
the second Bush administration, also requires earnings as a prerequisite to eli-
gibility. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-16, § 201, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C § 24
(2004)). Because it was enacted only in 2001, however, it cannot help to explain
earlier changes in labor force participation.
12. See WAYNE VROMAN, URBAN INST., ISSUE BRIEF ON UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE (2002) [hereinafter VROMAN, ISSUE BRIEF], available at
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410401.
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ployees could pay through a payroll tax to fund, for example,
temporary disability insurance available to parents after the
birth or adoption of a child. Employees who are parents could
be made to pay through a payroll tax applicable only to them.
The question is whether changes in public benefits and tax
expenditure policies justify shifting some of the costs of
work/family conflicts to employers through expanding UI eli-
gibility.
Before going further, two baseline questions must be
asked: Why is it not enough to establish that employees need
unemployment insurance coverage when they leave or reduce
labor force engagement due to family responsibilities? Why is
it also important to establish that employers are the appro-
priate group on which to place the tax burden to fund the ex-
pansion of unemployment insurance coverage? There are at
least two reasons, and the difference between them is the au-
dience.
The first audience is the many workers who are navigat-
ing between home and work. They well understand that their
lives are stressed and overburdened, but they may lack rea-
sons that go beyond the personal. They may be told that they
make little money because they lack skills or that their prob-
lems come from having too many children or children with
unusual challenges. Part of my project is to add my voice to
the chorus of those who identify systems that contribute to
the harshness of life for women who are concurrently meeting
their responsibilities at home and at work. A key systemic is-
sue is that public benefit and tax expenditure policies have
pushed and pulled women with young children into increas-
ing their labor force participation but have not, at the same
time, pushed and pulled employers into changing their em-
ployment practices. When more women understand these
connections, they may also understand that expanded unem-
ployment insurance eligibility is a small element of the
changes to which they should feel entitled. They should not
have to beg for this change based on their need; they should
be able to demand this change based on the contributions
their labor at home and at work make to the larger society.
The second audience is the many state legislators who
must vote on changes to unemployment insurance. In my ex-
perience, most in this audience are prepared to accept the
claims of employers that raising their unemployment insur-
2004 1097
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ance tax is unfair, and that to do so would mark the state as
unfriendly to business. The persuasion burden on advocates
is, therefore, high. Relying on arguments about need is insuf-
ficient, because many people are in need for many reasons.
My project is to offer an alternative argument, one that as-
sesses the employers' claims about cost in light of the other
public benefit and tax expenditure policies. Using this infor-
mation, advocates should be able to argue that employers are
experiencing artificially low costs for workers because of the
public benefits and tax expenditure policies that push and
pull mothers with young children into the market. Taxpayers
have been doing their part in helping low-income families.
Employers, however, have not had to spend what would oth-
erwise have been demanded by workers who are also parents
caring for young children. It is not unfair, then to demand
that they give back a small portion of what is, in effect, a sub-
sidy in the form of a larger unemployment insurance tax.
I. SUMMARY OF ESSENTIAL UI CHANGES"
Because families have come to rely on the earnings of
women, the hardships suffered when a woman becomes un-
employed can be severe. Job loss substantially increases ma-
terial hardship, including eviction, nonpayment of housing
costs, not having a telephone, and the like. 4 Some of this
hardship is ameliorated when the unemployed woman has ac-
cess to partial wage replacement through unemployment
.insurance, but women are fifteen percent less likely than men
to collect unemployment insurance benefits. 5 Women who
recently left welfare are nearly one-third less likely than
other women to qualify for UI.'
6
The unemployment insurance system was designed with
13. See UM'RANI & LOVELL, supra note 8 (discussing UI and women).
14. See ROBERT WAGMILLER, NAT'L CTR FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, DEBT
AND ASSETS AMONG LOW-INCOME FAMILIES (2003); LOVELL & OH, supra note 3,
at 10.
15. Maurice Emsellem, Worker Perspective on Unemployment Insurance in
2004, Presentation at Nat'l Employment Law Project, NASWA UI Director's
Conference (Oct. 23, 2003).
16. HEATHER BOUSHEY & JEFFREY B. WENGER, CTR. FOR ECONOMIC &
POLICY RESEARCH, UI IS NOT A SAFETY NET FOR UNEMPLOYED FORMER
WELFARE RECIPIENTS 5-6 (2003)(expalining that former welfare recipients are
less likely to be eligible for UI under the present rules due to novelty, brevity,
and the intermittent nature of work experience, low wages, and the need for
employment compatible with family responsibilities).
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the "ideal worker" in mind, that is, the man who could focus
on work and call on others, such as a wife, to provide house-
hold and child care labor. 7 Changes in UI in recent decades
have made it more difficult for caregivers to qualify." To
make unemployment insurance more available to low-income
women with children, eligibility rules need to be changed to
take into account the larger degree of responsibility that
women take for family care.'9 Five changes are widely advo-
cated:
a. good cause for leaving work needs to include fulfilling
family caregiving responsibilities, such as caring for a sick
child or other relative, moving to accompany a relocating fam-
ily member, remedying disruptions in child care, or attending
to a child's school problems;"
b. good cause also needs to give women with serious fam-
ily problems such as domestic violence opportunities to seek
safety;2'
c. the requirement that a worker be available for work
needs to include part-time as well as full-time work;2
d. minimum earnings requirements, used by states to
ensure that unemployment insurance is available only to
people who are committed to the labor force, need to be
17. See WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 110-11; REBECCA SMITH ET AL., NAT'L
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE:
CONFRONTING THE FAILURE OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEMS TO
SERVE WOMEN AND WORKING FAMILIES 2 (2003).
18. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 2-3; see also MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE
PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 225-26
(2001).
19. See Maranville, Changing Economy, supra note 8, at 323-24; Maran-
ville, Feminist Theory, supra note 8, at 1091-92; SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at
6-7. The Smith paper discusses a Texas study that found that "three times as
many women as men report leaving work for reasons associated with domestic
circumstances," and notes that the "failure of 'male breadwinner model' to ac-
commodate the experiences of claimants... may explain a significant part of
the gender gap in [UI] recipiency." Id.
20. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 5; WAYNE VROMAN, URBAN INST.,
EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM ON UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE (1998) [herein-
after VROMAN, EFFECTS OF WELWARE REFORM], available at
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=308031; VROMAN, ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 12.
21. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 17, at 23-24.
22. See id. at 5-6 (finding that one in four women are employed part-time,
i.e., less than 35 hours per week, compared with one in ten men); see also VRO-
MAN, EFFECTS OF WELWARE REFORM, supra note 20; VROMAN, ISSUE BRIEF,
supra note 12.
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changed to minimum hours of work requirements;23 and
e. hours of work performed in recent quarters (alterna-
tive base period) need to be counted so that people with in-
termittent work histories, such as caregivers, qualify for
unemployment insurance.24
None of these changes is cost-free. Cost estimates are not
perfect, but one respected analyst has suggested that the
range is approximately $100 million in 1996 dollars, a 0.5%
increase in costs over the 1998 costs. 25
II. "PUSH & PULL" PUBLIC BENEFIT AND TAX EXPENDITURE
POLICIES
To understand the synergy of federal public benefit and
tax expenditure policies on the costs of low-wage workers to
employers, it is useful to examine two of the programs in
greater detail.
A. Welfare Reform
In 1996, Congress adopted the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) as part of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.26 Also called wel-
fare reform, TANF replaced a program created during the
New Deal, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC).2 7 States are permitted to spend TANF funds and a
required amount of state funds (maintenance of effort) on a
wide variety of programs and benefits, including cash assis-
tance.2"
23. See BOUSHEY & WENGER, supra note 16, at 14; VROMAN, EFFECTS OF
WELFARE REFORM, supra note 20. Using hours worked as the eligibility factor
opens the door to making unemployment insurance more available to people
who are working year-round part-time at minimum wage, a practice of many
parents fulfilling substantial caregiving responsibilities. BOUSHEY & WENGER,
supra note 16, at 14.
24. See BOUSHEY & WENGER, supra note 16, at 14; VROMAN, EFFECTS OF
WELFARE REFORM, supra note 20; VROMAN, ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 12.
25. VROMAN, EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note 20.
26. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
27. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND
THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 237-306 (1994).
28. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, Title IV (codified as amended in 42
U.S.C. §§ 601-69).
1100 Vol: 44
2004 UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 1101
Welfare reform may be one of the reasons that more
women are in the labor force.29 Welfare reform also makes
the issue of unemployment insurance reform urgent because
welfare reform has made welfare benefits largely unavailable
for low-income workers who lose their jobs, and former wel-
fare recipients experience substantial instability in employ-
ment. °
The labor force participation of mothers took a leap in the
middle of the 1990s. 31 While women's labor force participa-
tion declined somewhat with the recession, the rate is still
higher now than in 1990.12 A similar pattern existed in low-
income families headed by single mothers.3 In 1992, 64% of
currently married mothers and 44% of never-married mothers
were in the labor force; in 2000, between 67 and 68% of both
groups were in the labor force.34 Between 1992 and 2000, the
labor force participation rate of single mothers whose young-
29. See JUNE E. O'NEILL & M. ANNE HILL, MANHATTAN INST. CTR FOR CIVIC
INNOVATION, GAINING GROUND? MEASURING THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM
ON WELFARE AND WORK 21-24 (2001), available at http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/cr_35.htm.
30. See JEFF CHAPMAN & JARED BERNSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., FALLING
THROUGH THE SAFETY NET: Low INCOME SINGLE MOTHERS IN THE JOBLESS
RECOVERY (2003) (arguing that although the average unemployment compensa-
tion for low-income single mothers grew an average of $66 between 2000 and
2001, it is not enough to offset the losses from other income supports and safety
net programs); UM'RANI & LOVELL, supra note 8; see also BOUSHEY & WENGER,
supra note 16.
31. See BACHU & O'CONNEL, supra note 4 (noting that 52.8% of women ages
fifteen to forty-four with children under age one were employed in 1990, 53.1%
in 1994, 68.7% in 1998, and 55.2% in 2000).
32. ROBERT LERMAN, URBAN INST., SINGLE MOTHERS RETAIN NEARLY ALL
THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE GAINS IN THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SLOWDOWN
(2003) (observing that the employed share of single mothers rose 17% between
1993 and 2000; it dropped only 2% between October 2000 and October 2002).
33. Calculating the employment rate of low-income single mothers varies
depending on how the researcher defines the minimum number of hours of work
the person must engage in before being considered a worker and how much
money the person must earn. According to one researcher, between 1995 and
2000, the percentage of these mothers who were working at least 20 hours a
week rose from 24% to 38%. The percentage dropped to 33% in 2001. RICHARD
WERTHEIMER, CHILD TRENDS, POOR FAMILIES IN 2001: PARENTS WORKING LESS
AND CHILDREN CONTINUING TO LAG BEHIND (2003), available at
http://12.109.133.224/Files/PoorFamiliesRB.pdf. Using different definitions, an-
other researcher found that the share of low-income single mothers who were
employed rose from 59.1% in 1995 to 68.5% in 2000. CHAPMAN & BERNSTEIN,
supra note 30.
34. O'NEILL & HILL, supra note 29, at 10, 21-24.
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est child was under seven increased from 46% to 70%.35
Some people attribute the change to welfare reform,
while others attribute it to the booming economy," as well as
changes in tax expenditure policies.37 It will probably never
be possible to tease out all the strands to determine whether
welfare reform has played a substantial role. It seems fair to
conclude that welfare reform has played some role, however. 8
Perhaps equally important is the work-first message of wel-
fare reform,39 which may contribute to worker discipline by
convincing people in poverty that cash subsidies are unavail-
able to newly out-of-work mothers.
Prior to welfare reform, low-income mothers, who cycled
in and out of employment to meet family responsibilities,
were able to use welfare when they were out of work. ° After
welfare reform, using welfare as the equivalent of unemploy-
ment insurance has become much more difficult. For exam-
ple, half as many children of employed single mothers re-
ceived welfare in 2001 as compared with 1996. 4'
Welfare reform has come to mean moving people from
welfare to work. To accomplish this, state programs empha-
size that work comes first. Welfare reform has had this effect
because of a combination of changes in statutes, state policies,
and welfare office practices. The statutory changes are the
work requirement, sanctions, time limits, and the elimination
35. Id. at 11.
36. Compare id. at 21-24 (welfare reform accounts for more than half of in-
creased labor force participation by low-income single mothers), with CHAPMAN
& BERNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 2.
37. See CHAPMAN & BERNSTEIN, supra note 30; see also Hearing on the
Employment Situation Before the Joint Economic Comm. on Improving Assis-
tance for the Unemployed, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Harry J. Holzer,
Professor of Public Policy, Georgetown University).
38. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Blank, Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United
States, 15 J. ECON. LIT. 1105, 1140 (2002); O'NEILL & HILL, supra note 29, at
10, 21 ("[R]egression results indicate that TANF ... accounts for more than half
of the decline in welfare participation and more than 60% of the rise in em-
ployment among single mothers.").
39. See infra notes 44-50.
40. See UM'RANI & LOVELL, supra note 8, at 1; see also BOUSHEY &
WENGER, supra note 16; Harry J. Holzer, Remarks at the Urban Inst., Unem-
ployment Insurance: Its Role and Adequacy as Layoffs Increase (Oct. 12, 2001),
a vailable at http://www.urban.org/content/NewsandEvents/Events/Events.htm.
41. WERTHEIMER, supra note 33 (25% in 1996 compared with 12% in 2001;
food stamp utilization declined from 77% to 60% in the same period); CHAPMAN
& BERNSTEIN, supra note 30 (unemployment rates among low-income single
mothers rose to 12.3% in 2002, but TANF caseloads did not rise).
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of an entitlement to cash assistance under TANF" States
are required to have a certain percentage of the adults in the
caseload participating in specified work activities," and states
can use federal funds to provide cash assistance benefits to
the adults in most of the cases for no more than five years."
They are required to sanction people who fail to comply by re-
ducing or eliminating their cash assistance.45
The statutory requirements have led many states to em-
phasize and enhance benefits tied to work, such as disregard-
ing a larger percentage of earned income, providing access to
childcare subsidies, offering assistance with transportation to
new workers, and forming partnerships with local employers
and workforce development projects.46 For example, a quarter
of families receiving TANF-funded cash assistance in 1999
also had earnings; that was true of only 8.4% of families
receiving AFDC in 1979. 47
The incentive structures of the work requirement have
also led most states to try to discourage people from applying
for benefits.4 The elimination of the entitlement of families
in poverty to cash assistance has freed states to deny benefits
to families in poverty and to impose a variety of pre-
application requirements, such as a job search. In addition,
many welfare offices have undergone a "culture change," un-
der which caseworkers stress to applicants and recipients the
importance of earning money rather than accepting cash as-
42. See Blank, supra note 38, at 1106; KATZ, supra note 18, at 326-28.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2000).
44. Id. § 608(a)(7). Approximately half the states adopted a simple sixty-
month time limit; the other half adopted shorter time limits or more complex
schemes, such as intermittent eligibility periods. See Robert A. Moffitt, The
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program, in MEANS-TESTED
TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 302-03 (Robert A. Moffitt ed.,
2003).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 607(e).
46. See KATZ, supra note 18, at 330-31; Blank, supra note 38.
47. Moffitt, supra note 44, at 312; WERTHEIMER, supra note 33 (among sin-
gle-parent families working less than 20 hours a week, welfare receipt declined
from 64% in 1996 to 31% in 2001; in single-parents working more than 20 hours
a week, welfare receipt declined from 25% in 1996 to 12% in 2001).
48. See, e.g., L. CHRISTOPHER PLEIN, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF
GOV'T, WELFARE REFORM IN A HARD PLACE: THE WEST VIRGINIA EXPERIENCE
15-17 (2001), available at
http://www.rockinst.org/publications/federalism/pleinrockreptl3.pdf; see also
Moffitt, supra note 44, at 305.
49. See Moffitt, supra note 44, at 303-05.
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sistance.5 °
The primacy of work is not limited to the cash assistance
aspect of welfare reform. Where a family's adult member
successfully leaves welfare for work, the family is entitled to
an automatic extension of its Medicaid benefit for a period of
time, regardless of financial eligibility.5 ' The family is also
entitled to an automatic extension of its food stamp benefit,
unless the state has failed to adopt the transitional benefit
option.52 If the family is living in public housing, it is insu-
lated for a period of time from the rent increase that would
otherwise accompany an increase in income.53 Conversely,
where a family's adult member is sanctioned for failure to
comply with the work requirement, the family faces much
more than the loss of cash assistance. The simplified food
stamp transitional benefit is unavailable.' The family can
access Medicaid coverage only through demonstrating finan-
cial eligibility.55 The shift of public benefits toward people in
the labor force is consistent with the increase in the number
of families in deep poverty since the mid-1990s.56 In short,
the economic penalty for not earning income in the world of
welfare reform is high.
B. Earned Income Tax Credit
Of the three largest income support programs funded by
the federal government, the Earned Income Tax Credit is the
largest in terms of the number of families receiving the bene-
fit.57 Just as important, EITC reaches a larger percentage of
50. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules,
Discretion and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000); see
also KATZ, supra note 18, at 329-30; Besharov, supra note 2, at 7; Thomas Gais
et al., Implementation of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, in THE NEW
WORLD OF WELFARE (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(11) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6 (2000); see also
HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WELFARE, WOMEN, AND HEALTH: THE ROLE
OF TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (2003).
52. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(s)(2) (2004).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(2)(D) (2004); 24 C.F.R. § 960.255 (2003).
54. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(s)(5); see also Wertheimer, supra note 33 (noting that,
among families in which a single adult works twenty hours a week or less, the
rate of food stamp utilization declined from 77% in 1996 to 60% in 2001; among
families in which a single adult works more than twenty hours a week, food
stamp utilization declined only 5% in same period).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6.
56. KATZ, supra note 18, at 334-40; Blank, supra note 38, at 1118.
57. In 1999, 86% of eligible families claimed EITC, compared to recipiency
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eligible families than either cash assistance under TANF or
food stamps," although recipiency rates among single women
with children are probably lower than the rates for other eli-
gible groups. 59 During 2000, EITC tax expenditures were
$31,471,000. 60 Nearly 20 million taxpayers claimed the
credit.61
The EITC is available to some childless workers, but
most beneficiaries are households with children. 2 In 2001,
taxpayers with two or more children could receive as much as
$4,008.63 That amount was paid to taxpayers earning be-
tween $10,020 and $13,090 per year.' Below and above that
level of earnings, the credit is less; the credit ends when the
taxpayer earns more than $32,121.65 The credit is fully re-
fundable, regardless of whether the taxpayer owes income
tax. 66
The EITC acts as a wage supplement for low-income
workers. Approximately two-thirds of EITC payments are re-
ceived by workers making less than $6.50 an hour, and more
than ninety-five percent go to workers whose wages are below
the median of $9.42 an hour. In the late 1990s, EITC pay-
ments brought approximately 4.3 million people above the
poverty line.68
Economists agree that the EITC has had a strong impact
on bringing women in single-parent households into the labor
force; one study concluded that as much as 62% of the in-
crease in single mothers' labor force participation was attrib-
rates of 67% for food stamps and 52% for TANF. LEONARD E. BURMAN &
DEBORAH I. KOBES, TAx POLICY CTR, EITC REACHES MORE ELIGIBLE FAMILIES
THAN TANF, FOOD STAMPS (2003).
58. Id.
59. V. Joseph Hotz & John Karl Scholz, The Earned Income Tax Credit, in
MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 156 (Robert A.
Moffitt ed., 2003).
60. Id. at 155.
61. Id.
62. See generally id.
63. Id. at 148.
64. Id.
65. Hotz & Scholz, supra note 59, at 147.
66. Id. at 155.
67. Id. at 158.
68. Id. at 159; see also Blank, supra note 38, at 1108 (noting that household
income for a woman with two children earning minimum wage rose 34.3% be-
tween 1989 and 2000, from $10,568 to $14,188 because of combined impact of
minimum wage and EITC increases).
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utable to the EITC.69 Teasing out its separate impact from
welfare reform and employment expansions of the late 1990s
still appears to baffle analysts, however."
III. A STORY
Angela, age 28, has two children, Joel, age 3, and Laura,
age 6. Their father Tom, Angela's partner for four years, left
them shortly after Joel was born. Angela and the children
live on the edge of a deeply impoverished section of a major
city. She received cash assistance under TANF for three
years. During that time, Tom began paying child support in
the amount of approximately $150 a month. His payments
fluctuate somewhat because his construction employment is
intermittent. To fulfill the TANF work activity requirement,
Angela participated in an employment preparation and
search program, which taught people how to fill out applica-
tions, do interviews, show up at a job on time, etc. Through
the program, Angela was offered a job as a janitor at a nurs-
ing home. Work begins at 6 a.m. and ends at 2:30 p.m. When
offered the job, Angela asked to begin work at 8 a.m. so that
she could get the children to school and childcare before leav-
ing for work. She was told that was impossible. She knew
she would lose her cash assistance if she refused the job offer,
so she accepted the job.
On workdays, Angela gets up each morning at 4:15. She
gets herself ready for work, then puts out breakfast for
Laura, and packs lunches for the three of them. She takes
Joel, still asleep, to a neighbor whose child goes to the same
childcare provider. She charges Angela $10 a week to help
out with Joel in the mornings. Angela gets on the bus by 5:15
for the thirty-five minute ride to work. Laura's alarm clock
rings at 6:30. Angela calls her from a payphone at 7:00 to
make sure she is up, dressed, and eating breakfast. The of-
fice phone cannot be used for personal calls. Angela wears a
pager that Laura uses to let her know that she has left for
school. After school, the pager rings again to let Angela know
that Laura is home and has locked herself into the apart-
69. Hotz & Scholz, supra note 59, at 183; see Besharov, supra note 2, at 9
(EITC is credited with causing 20 to 30% of the decline in welfare rolls in the
late 1990s.).
70. Hotz & Scholz, supra note 59, at 184.
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ment. Angela arrives at Joel's childcare provider between
3:30 and 4:00, depending on whether she catches the first bus
after work. She and Joel arrive home around 4:30. By then,
Laura has had a snack and watched some TV. They make
dinner together, do some chores, and go to bed.
Angela's job pays $6.00 an hour, or approximately $240 a
week or $12,480 a year, which is within the range of the av-
erage earnings of women leaving welfare for work.7' Like
most low-paid jobs, it provides no paid leave or health insur-
ance subsidy. If she misses work, she does not get paid and
she may be fired. So long as she does not miss too much work
and her annual earnings do not fall below $10,020, she is eli-
gible for the maximum EITC credit of $4,008.72 That is the
equivalent of an additional $77 a week in her paycheck, if her
employer is willing to pay her that way. Otherwise, she will
receive the EITC credit as a lump sum when she files a fed-
eral income tax form. She and her children will continue to
be covered by Medicaid for a year after leaving welfare. 3 Af-
ter that, again depending on the state, the children may be
covered by the Children's Health Insurance Program,74 for
which Angela may have to pay a premium. Some states pro-
vide full or partial subsidies for childcare for a period of time
after parents leave welfare, and some also provide a transpor-
tation subsidy for a period of time. Many have elected to pro-
vide a transitional food stamp benefit, under which the family
continues to receive as much in food stamps after leaving wel-
fare as it did before the parent began working.75 After the
five-month transitional benefit ends, the family may continue
to qualify for a smaller amount of food stamps if the parent is
still employed. Some housing subsidy programs keep the
family's rent stable for a year after the parent becomes em-
ployed rather than immediately adjusting it to reflect the in-
creased income.7" The family's economic well-being is further
enhanced because Tom's child support payments will now be
sent to Angela rather than retained by the state as reim-
bursement for cash assistance.
71. See Besharov, supra note 2, at 11.
72. See 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000).
73. Blank, supra note 38, at 1108.
74. See id.
75. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(s) (2004).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(2)(D) (2000); 24 C.F.R. § 960.255 (2003).
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So long as Angela remains employed," the family's eco-
nomic situation is better by a substantial degree compared to
its situation on welfare. If her employment ends, however,
the situation gets substantially worse. As explained earlier,
if she loses her job for family-related reasons, she is highly
unlikely to qualify for the temporary partial wage replace-
ment provided by unemployment insurance. So long as she is
not on welfare, the family will continue to receive Tom's child
support. Depending on how much she earns in the calendar
year before losing employment, her EITC could decline sub-
stantially. Their continued eligibility for food stamps and
medical assistance will be means-tested. Angela may lose the
transportation and child care subsidies quickly, even if she
could use them during her job search. Finally, Angela is
unlikely to turn to welfare for help, at least right away. She
may have used up her time, or she may want to bank what-
ever months of eligibility that remain for an emergency. Al-
ternatively, she may have become persuaded that applying
would be useless. She may be right: depending on how she
loses work, she may not qualify for welfare for a period of
time or until she can prove that she has done an adequate job
search.
A major reason Angela may become unemployed is her
responsibility for two children. Angela will have to miss work
if Joel gets sick, since neither the neighbor nor the childcare
provider will take a sick child. If the nursing home demands
that Angela stay for a second shift because another employee
is sick, Angela cannot comply. To do so would mean leaving
Laura alone for many hours after school and hoping that the
childcare provider can find someone to care for Joel until mid-
night. If Laura encounters problems at school or if either
child needs to see a doctor for a checkup, Angela will have to
miss work. Once Angela misses too much work or refuses
overtime too often, she loses not only pay, but also her job.
Angela would not lose her job if her employer would be
willing to allow her to work thirty hours a week rather than
forty, which would reduce her dependence on multiple child-
care providers. Angela would not lose her job if her employer
provided paid sick and annual leave. Angela would not lose
77. Once the transitional benefits end, the family's economic situation de-
clines as well, which is a topic for a different paper.
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her job if her employer did not require mandatory overtime.
Angela would not lose her job if her employer paid her a liv-
ing wage so she could put Joel in a childcare center that has a
sick room, pay for an after-school program for Laura, and
perhaps buy a used car to reduce her commuting time to fif-
teen minutes.
But employers are not required to do any of those things.
And Angela's power to make her employer do things that
would help employees like her is constrained by the public
benefits and tax expenditure systems on which she relies.
For example, if she refuses to stay at work to do mandatory
overtime because of childcare problems, her employer may be
entitled to fire her for cause, again eliminating unemploy-
ment insurance coverage. If she is laid off from her job, she
would be eligible for unemployment insurance unless she con-
cludes that she cannot sustain full-time employment while
caring for two young children. If she tells the unemployment
insurance office that she is seeking part-time work, she will
be found ineligible for UI in many states. If she quits work
because she thinks Laura is in danger when she walks home
from school and stays home alone, she may be right about her
child's welfare, but many states will find her ineligible for
welfare and food stamps."8 If Angela decides, as many eco-
nomic analysts have suggested, that unionization would help
people like her get better pay and benefits, she may be
tempted to attend an organizing meeting and risk getting
fired in retaliation.79  Further, her workmates may be
unenthusiastic about unionizing to obtain better wages
because the EITC, Children's Health Insurance, food stamps,
and other public benefits raise their actual standard of living
beyond what their paycheck provides. °
IV. WHAT NEXT?
The public benefits and tax expenditure systems, coupled
78. See Nina Bernstein, Daily Choice Turned Deadly: Children Left on
Their Own, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 2003, § 1 (Metropolitan), at 1.
79. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 18, at 181 (describing the "union premium"
enjoyed by low-income union members).
80. Cf CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX
EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 150-52 (1997) (EITC
was a politically-acceptable alternative to increases in minimum wage in the
late 1990s.).
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with the low value of the minimum wage, have produced a
system in which people like Angela must enter the job market
and stay there, regardless of the costs to their family respon-
sibilities. Employers hold the cards. That they have gained
financial advantage from this system is shown by the fact
that low-wage workers in many occupations have not only ex-
perienced high unemployment in the last several years, they
have also seen their average earnings decline, while the in-
comes of those in higher quintiles have risen.8' In recent
years, further, employers have cut back rather than increased
family-friendly programs. 2
Unemployment compensation reform to expand eligibility
for work/family issues is a modest response to this situation.
It only provides temporary and partial wage replacement.
But it is significant, both symbolically and materially.
At a symbolic level, eligibility for unemployment insur-
ance confers the status of "worker" on people who are concur-
rently meeting responsibilities at home and at work. One's
identity as a worker, both personally and socially, is an es-
sential entry point into mainstream culture and political em-
powerment. 3 Unemployment insurance, further, is perceived
as a legitimate entitlement, that is, a source of income for re-
sponsible people. When mothers with young children can
turn to the UI system rather than the welfare system for in-
come replacement, they have the opportunity to avoid the
stigma and demeaning processes of participating in public
benefit programs.
At a material level, unemployment insurance may pro-
81. See Chart of the Week: Real Wages, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2004, at F3;
Alejandra Marchevsky & Jeanne Theoharis, Welfare Reform, Globalization and
the Racialization of Entitlement, 41 AM. STUD. 235, 236 (2000). But cf
LERMAN, supra note 32 (noting that between October 2001 and October 2002,
wages of single mothers increased three percent after inflation and that wage
growth was even higher among low-wage single mothers); HOWARD, supra note
80, at 150-52.
82. See Stephanie Armour, More Companies Downsize Family-Friendly Pro-
grams, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2003, at 1A.
83. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial In-
terpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the
Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990); Amy L. Wax, Some-
thing for Nothing. Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Requirements, 52 EMORY
L.J. 1 (2003) (presenting compelling arguments for not conditioning welfare on
work and discussing why those arguments cannot overcome political resistance
to guaranteed income policy).
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vide the key to a family's ability to maintain something close
to its usual standard of living while the parent is seeking
work. It may allow the family to avoid housing and food inse-
curity, with important consequences for the health and edu-
cation opportunities of the children.'
The material consequences affect employers as well.
Employers pay most of the cost of the unemployment insur-
ance system. All employers pay into the system.85 Some em-
ployers pay more than others, however; their costs depend in
large part on how many successful claims their former em-
ployees make. If UI eligibility changes to include parents
who lose or reduce their labor force participation to meet fam-
ily responsibilities, all employers will pay a higher UI tax.
But those who feel the pinch the least will be those who adopt
more family-friendly employment policies. Those who, like
Angela's employer, refuse to make changes that parents need
will have more successful claims made against them by for-
mer employees, and their costs will rise. In an employment
system that offers few incentives for employers to modify
their practices, unemployment insurance can open the door.86
Unemployment insurance reform, then, is a small but
84. john a. powell, The Needs of Members in a Legitimate Democratic State,
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 969 (2004).
85. It should be noted that, in recent years, employers have been making
record low contributions to the UI trust fund. See Emsellem, supra note 15, at
10 (observing that the national average tax on total wages in 1994 was almost
double that of 2002).
Another point is important. As economists have demonstrated, the costs
of unemployment insurance fall on employees as well as employers, because
employers, over time, pass through the costs of benefits to employees in the
form of reduced compensation. The employees who will be affected by this pass-
through include all employees, however, not only those struggling at that mo-
ment to be responsible concurrently at home and at work. Discussion of
whether it is fair to impose this cost on employees generally, rather than only
on employees who are parents with children at home is beyond the scope of this
article.
86. For employers to have an incentive to modify their practices, employers
will have to be "charged" when the occasion for unemployment is a conflict be-
tween work and family responsibilities. Under current law, these benefits are
usually treated as "noncharged," meaning that all employers share the cost as
part of their basic unemployment insurance taxes, regardless of whether they
have adopted family friendly policies. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-4-78 (2004);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-225a (West 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §
1195 (West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-9 (2003); Rebecca Smith, Richard W.
McHugh & Robin R. Runge, Unemployment Insurance and Domestic Violence:
Learning from Our Experiences, LAPTOP Regional Conference, at
www.nelp.org/docUploads/pub92%2Epdf (last modified May 2002).
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significant part of an effort to make life better for low-wage
workers, especially those who try to be responsible concur-
rently at home and at work. And it is an effort that has some
potential for success. Reform campaigns are underway in
half the states. 7 Numerous states have improved eligibility
standards in recent years in ways that help parents who have
concurrent responsibilities at home and at work.88 UI reform
is a missing piece of welfare reform, and it is time for advo-
cates for low-wage workers, for union organizing campaigns,
and for women's rights to join together in achieving it.
87. See Maurice Emsellem, The Changing Workforce & the Unemployment
Insurance System, Presentation at Santa Clara University Law Review Sympo-
sium (Jan. 30, 2004) (on file with Santa Clara Law Review).
88. See id.; UM'RANI & LOVELL, supra note 8, at 3-4 (describing UI reforms
and reform coalitions in Wisconsin and Massachusetts).
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